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The population of Mexican-born persons residing in the United States
has increased at an unprecedented rate in recent decades. This increase
can be attributed to both legal and illegal immigration. During the entire
decade of the 1950s, only about three hundred thousand legal Mexican im-
migrants entered the United States, making up 12 percent of the immigrant
ﬂow. In the 1990s, 2.2 million Mexicans entered the United States legally,
making up almost 25 percent of the legal ﬂow (U.S. Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service 2002). In addition, it is estimated that (as of January
2000) there were 7 million illegal aliens residing in the United States, with
4.8 million (68 percent of this stock) being of Mexican origin (U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce 2004). As a result of the increase in the number of legal
and illegal Mexican immigrants, nearly 9.2 million Mexican-born persons
resided in the United States in 2000, comprising about 29.5 percent of the
foreign-born population (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2003).
It is instructive to place the Mexican immigrant inﬂux of the late twenti-
eth century in the context of earlier immigrant ﬂows. In 1920, toward the
end of the ﬁrst great migration, the largest two national origin populations
enumerated by the 1920 Census were Germans and Italians, and together
these two populations comprised about 23.7 percent of the foreign-born
population at the time (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975). From this per-
spective, it is clear that the Mexican-born population of the late twentieth
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research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.century is historically unprecedented, being both numerically and propor-
tionately larger than any other immigrant inﬂux in the past century.
This paper analyzes the evolution of Mexican immigration as a compo-
nent of the U.S. workforce during the twentieth century. As a result of the
rapidly increasing Mexican immigrant inﬂux described earlier, the fraction
of the workforce composed of Mexican-born workers increased rapidly af-
ter 1970. As the top panel of ﬁgure 1.1shows, only 0.4 percent of the work-
force aged eighteen–sixty-four in 1970 was composed of Mexican-born
workers. By 2000, the Mexican immigrant share had increased to 4.0 per-
cent. The increase is even larger in the male workforce, where 0.5 percent
of working men were Mexican-born in 1970 and 5.1 percent in 2000.1
It is of interest to contrast the explosion of Mexican workers in the U.S.
workforce in the late twentieth century with the demographic trends at the
beginning of the century. Although Mexican immigration was relatively
small in the early 1900s, the relative number of Mexican immigrants in the
U.S. workforce increased to 0.6 percent in 1920 (and continued rising un-
til the late 1920s). The halting of European migration to the United States
with the outbreak of World War I followed by Congressional action to re-
strict immigration combined with strong labor demand in the booms of the
late 1910s and the 1920s engendered substantial eﬀorts by U.S. employers
to recruit Mexican laborers through private labor contractors (Massey,
Durand, and Malone 2002).2 Remarkably, the Mexican immigrant share
went into a long steady decline after the 1920s that lasted for several
decades. It was not until the 1970s that the Mexican immigrant share of the
workforce was at least as large as it was in the 1920s!
The reasons for the declining Mexican share in the workforce are not
entirely clear.3 Until 1965, there was not a numerical limitation on immi-
gration from countries in the Western Hemisphere. In theory, at least, 
legal migration from Mexico was guided by a “ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-served” ap-
proach. Potential immigrants applied for entry and local consular oﬃcials
had a great deal of discretion in determining which applicants would be
provided entry visas.
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1. Tabulations from the Current Population Survey indicate that the Mexican immigrant
share of the workforce has continued rising rapidly in recent years. The Mexican immigrant
share of the overall workforce aged eighteen–sixty-four reached 4.7 percent in 2005 and had
risen to 6.2 percent for males and 2.9 percent for females.
2. Mexican immigrants were exempted from the head tax and literacy test imposed on new
arrivals in 1917 and from the national origin quotas of the immigration restriction acts of the
1920s.
3. Massey, Durand, and Malone (2002) argue that the weak U.S. labor market of the Great
Depression generated more hostile attitudes of U.S. citizens toward Mexican immigrants and
created political pressures leading to several highly publicized mass deportations of Mexican
immigrants over the course of the 1930s. These changing economic incentives and immigra-
tion policies may have played a key role in stemming Mexican migration to the United States




Fig. 1.1 Growth of Mexican immigrants in the U.S. workforce, 1900–2000: 
A, All workers; B, Male workers; C, Female workers
Note: All statistics are calculated using the sample of workers aged eighteen–sixty-four.To ease the labor force shortage caused by World War II in the agricul-
tural industry during the early 1940s, the Bracero Program was launched
on August 4, 1942. This guest-worker program brought almost 5 million
Mexican-born farm workers to the United States between 1942 and 1964,
when it was abruptly terminated by the United States. The main reason
given for the discontinuation of the program at the time was the assertion
that the Bracero Program depressed the wages of native-born Americans
in the agricultural industry (Massey and Liang 1989; Marcell 1994).
The latest wave of illegal immigration from Mexico began in the late
1960s, after the discontinuation of the Bracero Program. There is, in fact,
a clear link between the end of the Bracero Program and the beginning of
the illegal alien ﬂow, at least as measured by the number of Mexican na-
tionals aliens apprehended as they attempt to enter the United States ille-
gally. The number of Mexican illegal aliens apprehended by the Border Pa-
trol began to increase soon after the Bracero Program ended. In 1964, for
example, the Border Patrol apprehended only 41.6 thousand Mexican ille-
gal aliens. By 1970, apprehensions were up to 348.2 thousand annually. In
1986, about 1.7 million Mexican illegal aliens were apprehended (U.S. Im-
migration and Naturalization Service, various issues).
Although the discontinuation of the Bracero Program may help explain
why illegal immigration accelerated in the 1960s and 1970s, there are sev-
eral questions that remain unanswered. The wage gap between Mexico and
the United States has been large for many decades, and it is far from clear
that it is larger now than it was at the beginning or middle of the twentieth
century. Why then didn’t we observe large ﬂows of Mexican immigrants
prior to the 1970s? It is possible, of course, that the policy changes initiated
by the 1965 Amendments and subsequent legislation, which made family
reuniﬁcation the central goal of immigration policy, could have eased the
entry of Mexicans in the United States, but, at least in theory, Mexican im-
migration was not greatly restricted prior to the post-1965 policy shifts.
Why did so few Mexicans take advantage of it? Or were the institutional
barriers placed at the consular level in Mexico so forbidding that relatively
few Mexicans even bothered to apply to enter the United States?
We do not know the answers to these questions. What we do know, how-
ever, is that the Mexican immigrant population today stands out from the
rest of the immigrant population in two striking ways. It is well known, of
course, that there has also been a sizable increase in the number of non-
Mexican immigrants admitted to the United States. Nevertheless, Mexican
immigrants comprise an ever-larger fraction of the foreign-born stock of
the United States (see ﬁgure 1.2). Second, as we will document, Mexican
immigrants tend to have demographic and socioeconomic characteristics
that diﬀer signiﬁcantly not only from that of the native-born population,
but from that of other immigrants as well. In general, the economic per-
16 George J. Borjas and Lawrence F. Katzformance of Mexican immigrants lags signiﬁcantly behind that of other
immigrant groups, and this lagging performance is, to an important extent,
transmitted to future generations of native-born workers of Mexican an-
cestry.
This paper diﬀers from earlier contributions in the immigration litera-
ture by focusing speciﬁcally on the evolution of the Mexican-born work-
force in the United States.4 We use data drawn from the Integrated Public
Use Microdata Samples (IPUMS) of the U.S. Decennial Census through-
out the entire twentieth century to describe the demographic and eco-
nomic evolution of this population. The paper examines the evolution of
the relative skills and economic performance of Mexican immigrants and
contrasts this evolution to that experienced by other immigrants arriving
in the United States during the period. The paper also examines the costs
and beneﬁts of this inﬂux by examining how the Mexican inﬂux has altered
economic opportunities in the most aﬀected labor markets and by dis-
cussing how the relative prices of goods and services produced by Mexican
immigrants may have changed over time.
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4. Important exceptions include Feliciano (2001), who examines the economic perfor-
mance of Mexican immigrants through 1990; Camarota (2001), who attempts a cost-beneﬁt
analysis of Mexican immigration; and Trejo (2003), who studies the intergenerational mobil-
ity of Mexican-origin workers in the U.S. labor market. Broader analyses of immigrant and
Hispanic labor market performance in the United States include Borjas (1985, 1995),
Funkhouser and Trejo (1995), and LaLonde and Topel (1992).
Fig. 1.2 Mexican immigrants as a share of U.S. immigrant workforce
Note: All statistics are calculated using the sample of workers aged eighteen–sixty-four.1.2 Data and Key Trends
The analysis uses data drawn from all of the available IPUMS of the U.S.
Decennial Census between 1900 and 2000.5 This long-term look at the
available data helps to provide a historical account of the evolution and
economic performance of Mexican immigrants in the U.S. workforce.
Throughout the analysis, a person is classiﬁed as an “immigrant” if he
or she was born in a foreign country; all other workers are classiﬁed as “na-
tives.”6 Persons who are immigrants and who were born in Mexico com-
prise the sample of Mexican immigrants. The pre-1970 censuses comprise
(roughly) a 1 percent random sample of the population. Beginning with
1980, the data comprise a 5 percent random sample of the population. The
entire available sample in each census is used in the empirical analysis.
In each census, the study is restricted to persons aged eighteen–sixty-
four who work in the civilian sector, are not enrolled in school, and do not
reside in group quarters.7 When appropriate, the sampling weights re-
ported in the IPUMS data are used in the calculations.
1.2.1 The Geographic Sorting of Mexican Immigrants
Table 1.1 begins the empirical analysis by documenting how the geo-
graphic sorting of Mexican immigrants in the United States changed over
the twentieth century. The top panel of the table reports the share of the
stock of Mexican immigrants (both male and female) who reside in a par-
ticular state at a particular point in time, while the bottom panel reports the
fraction of the state’s workforce that is composed of Mexican immigrants.
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5. General-use IPUMS samples are currently available for every decennial census in the
twentieth century except for 1930. A preliminary 1930 sample became available after the em-
pirical analysis was completed for this paper.
6. Persons born abroad of American parents and persons born in a U.S. possession are also
classiﬁed as natives. It is important to note that the census data contain both legal Mexican
immigrants as well as those illegal immigrants who answered the census questionnaire.
7. In the 1940–2000 samples, the study is also restricted to workers who report positive
weeks worked and hours worked weekly and positive earnings in the calendar year prior to
the survey. Prior to 1980, the information on hours worked refers to hours worked last week;
in the 1980–2000 Censuses, the information refers to usual hours worked weekly. In the 1960–
1970 Censuses, weeks worked are reported as a categorical variable. We imputed weeks
worked for each worker as follows: 6.5 weeks for thirteen weeks or less, 20 for fourteen–
twenty-six weeks, 33 for twenty-seven–thirty-nine weeks, 43.5 for forty–forty-seven weeks,
48.5 for forty-eight–forty-nine weeks, and 51 for ﬁfty–ﬁfty-two weeks. Similarly, in the 1960–
1970 Censuses, hours worked last week are reported as a categorical variable. We imputed
weekly hours worked for each worker as follows: 7.5 hours for one–fourteen hours, 22 for ﬁf-
teen–twenty-nine hours, 32 for thirty–thirty-four hours, 37 for thirty-ﬁve–thirty-nine hours,
40 for forty hours exactly, 44.5 for forty-one–forty-eight hours, 54 for forty-nine–ﬁfty-nine
hours, and 70 for at least sixty hours. In the 1940–1980 Censuses, the top coded annual salary
is multiplied by 1.5. We calculated a wage rate for each worker by taking the ratio of annual
earnings to the product of weeks worked and hours worked weekly. We restrict the analysis in
each census to workers whose calculated hourly wage rate lies between $1 and $250 (in 1999
dollars).The top panel of table 1.1 reports an important trend: a steady and sub-
stantial redistribution in Mexican immigration from Texas to California
throughout much of the twentieth century. In 1900, for example, 62.5 per-
cent of Mexican immigrants lived in Texas, and only 7.8 percent lived in
California. By 1950, roughly equal numbers of Mexican immigrants lived
in Texas (39.1 percent) and California (40.3 percent). By 1980, almost 60
percent of Mexican immigrants lived in California, and the fraction of
those living in Texas had further declined to 21.2 percent. Between 1980
and 2000, however, California seemed to become a relatively less attractive
destination for Mexican immigrants. By 2000, the fraction of Mexican im-
migrants living there had declined to 42.1 percent. Note, however, that this
decline was not accompanied by an increase in the fraction choosing to re-
side in Texas; that share was relatively constant over the period.
Table 1.1 also shows that the recent decline in the relative share of Mex-
ican immigrants who choose to live in California has been accompanied by
a remarkable increase in Mexican immigration to states that had never
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Table 1.1 Regional concentration of the Mexican-born workforce, selected states
1900 1910 1920 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Percentage of Mexican immigrants residing in:
Arizona 17.2 10.7 12.5 7.6 5.4 4.1 4.0 3.0 3.3 4.4
California 7.8 19.9 17.9 40.4 40.3 44.6 55.1 58.7 57.4 42.1
Colorado 0.0 1.3 3.1 1.9 1.0 0.9 0.4 0.8 0.8 2.0
Florida 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.5 1.4 2.2
Georgia 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.5 2.2
Illinois 1.6 0.2 1.4 3.0 2.5 6.6 8.2 8.6 7.3 7.3
Kansas 0.0 12.2 2.9 2.2 1.5 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.7
New Jersey 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.8
New Mexico 10.9 5.3 4.2 2.8 1.7 1.4 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1
New York 0.0 0.7 0.6 1.5 0.7 1.7 0.5 0.5 1.1 1.7
North Carolina 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 2.0
Texas 62.5 46.2 50.6 35.3 39.1 33.2 23.4 21.2 20.0 19.9
Mexican immigrants as percentage of state’s workforce
Arizona 19.3 17.1 23.6 7.8 4.3 2.3 2.2 2.9 4.8 10.2
California 0.7 2.3 2.9 2.2 2.0 1.8 2.4 6.2 9.8 14.8
Colorado 0.0 0.5 2.0 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.6 1.1 4.8
Florida 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.5 1.6
Georgia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 2.8
Illinois 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.6 1.8 3.1 6.5
Kansas 0.0 2.7 1.2 0.7 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.7 2.9
New Jersey 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.0
New Mexico 10.6 6.0 8.6 3.2 1.8 1.2 1.0 2.1 4.0 7.3
New York 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 1.1
North Carolina 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 2.6
Texas 3.4 4.3 7.7 3.1 3.0 2.4 1.9 3.7 6.0 10.9
Note: All statistics are calculated using the sample of workers aged eighteen–sixty-four.been the recipients of large numbers of these immigrants. In 1980, for ex-
ample, Mexican immigrants had, at best, a negligible presence in both
North Carolina and Georgia. By 2000, however, almost 3 percent of the
workforce in each of these states was composed of Mexican immigrants.
Similarly, less than 1 percent of workers in Colorado were Mexican-born
in 1980; by 2000, almost 5 percent of Colorado’s workforce was Mexican-
born. Although often noted in the popular press, this remarkable and sud-
den shift in the geographic sorting of Mexican immigrants in the United
States has received little systematic analysis, and the reasons leading to the
dramatic geographic redistribution are still not well understood.8
Because there were relatively few Mexican immigrants living in the
United States at the beginning of the twentieth century, it is worth noting
that even though nearly two-thirds of Mexican immigrants lived in Texas
in 1900, only 3.4 percent of the Texas workforce was Mexican-born. By
2000, however, nearly 14.8 percent of the California workforce and 10.9
percent of the Texas workforce were Mexican-born. The relative impor-
tance of Mexican immigration as a component of the workforce of the
main immigrant-receiving states, therefore, now stands at a historic high.
The growth has been most dramatic in California. In 1970, only 2.4 percent
of California’s workforce was Mexican-born. By 2000, this statistic had in-
creased sixfold, to 14.8 percent.
1.2.2 Trends in Educational Attainment and Occupation
The skill composition of the Mexican immigrant workforce diﬀers strik-
ingly from that of the native workforce as well as from that of other immi-
grants. We begin the description of the skill composition of the various
groups by comparing the trend in the educational attainment of native
working men with that of Mexican immigrant men. The census provides
data on educational attainment beginning in 1940, so that this phase of the
study focuses on the trends in the post-1940 period. As table 1.2 shows,
67.3 percent of male native-born working men were high-school dropouts
in 1940.9 This high native dropout rate was lower than that of Mexican im-
migrant men, where 94.6 percent had not completed high school. To pro-
vide a point of reference for these statistics, the table also reports that 84.4
percent of non-Mexican immigrant working men at that time were high
school dropouts.10
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8. See Card and Lewis (2005) for an initial analysis of the geographic redistribution of Mex-
ican immigrants during the 1990s.
9. We refer to anyone with fewer than twelve years of completed schooling as a high school
dropout.
10. Information on literacy in the 1900 to 1920 censuses suggests a similar educational gap
for Mexican immigrant workers in the early twentieth century. For example, the literacy rate
for Mexican-born male workers was 50.1 percent in 1910 as compared to 92.8 percent for
native-born male workers and 87.0 percent for non-Mexican immigrant working men.By 2000, the fraction of male native-born workers who are high school
dropouts had fallen by almost 60 percentage points, to 8.7 percent. In con-
trast, the fraction of Mexican-born high school dropouts had fallen by
only about 30 percentage points, to 63 percent. Again, as a reference point,
note that the fraction of high school dropouts in the non-Mexican immi-
grant population had fallen by almost as much as in the native-born work-
force, to 17 percent. As a result of these trends, the data indicate a re-
markable fact: the population of male high school dropouts in the United
States has become disproportionately Mexican-born. In 1940, 0.5 percent
of all male high school dropouts were Mexican immigrants. Even as re-
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Table 1.2 Percent distribution of educational attainment
1940 1950 1960 1970 1080 1990 2000
Male workers
Native-born
High school dropouts 67.3 61.3 52.0 38.4 23.8 12.9 8.7
High school graduates 20.0 24.2 27.8 35.2 39.1 36.0 34.5
Some college 6.4 7.4 9.4 11.9 16.8 26.6 29.4
College graduates 6.3 7.1 10.8 14.5 20.3 24.5 27.4
Mexican immigrants
High school dropouts 94.6 91.2 88.3 82.6 77.2 70.4 63.0
High school graduates 3.0 6.7 6.7 11.7 14.3 19.0 25.1
Some college 1.0 1.5 2.7 3.6 5.7 7.8 8.5
College graduates 1.4 0.6 2.4 2.2 2.9 2.8 3.4
Non-Mexican immigrants
High school dropouts 84.4 76.4 64.5 45.5 30.2 21.0 17.0
High school graduates 9.2 14.5 16.8 23.9 26.7 26.0 25.8
Some college 2.8 4.0 8.3 11.7 15.2 21.3 20.9
College graduates 3.7 5.1 10.4 18.9 27.9 31.7 36.3
Female workers
Native-born
High school dropouts 50.6 46.3 42.4 31.2 19.2 9.8 6.5
High school graduates 32.1 35.3 37.6 45.3 47.3 38.7 32.8
Some college 9.5 10.1 11.0 12.6 17.9 29.9 33.5
College graduates 7.8 8.3 9.0 11.0 15.6 21.6 27.3
Mexican immigrants
High school dropouts 84.5 82.4 83.9 77.3 72.9 64.7 57.0
High school graduates 12.5 10.3 11.4 16.9 17.7 21.9 26.6
Some college 2.1 4.4 2.7 4.5 7.0 10.5 11.8
College graduates 0.9 2.9 2.0 1.4 2.4 3.0 4.5
Non-Mexican immigrants
High school dropouts 79.2 68.5 59.3 43.9 30.1 20.0 15.5
High school graduates 15.8 22.3 25.5 33.7 35.2 31.1 27.6
Some college 2.8 5.0 9.6 12.6 16.8 24.0 24.4
College graduates 2.2 4.2 5.7 9.9 17.9 24.9 32.6
Note: All statistics are calculated using the sample of workers aged eighteen–sixty-four.cently as 1980, only 4.1 percent of male high school dropouts were Mexi-
can immigrants. By 2000, however, 26.2 percent of all male high school
dropouts were Mexican-born.
The growing disadvantage of Mexican immigrants at the bottom of the
educational attainment distribution is matched by an equally growing dis-
advantage at the top of the distribution, where a fast-growing number of
native workers and non-Mexican immigrants are college graduates. In
1940, there was relatively little diﬀerence in college graduation rates among
the three groups; by 2000, however, there is a wide gulf separating college
graduation rates between Mexican immigrants and the other groups. In
particular, 6.3 percent of native working men were college graduates in
1940, and this fraction had quadrupled to 27.4 percent by 2000. Similarly,
3.7 percent of non-Mexican immigrant men were college graduates in
1940, and this fraction had increased almost tenfold to 36.3 percent by
2000. In contrast, only 1.4 percent of Mexican immigrant men in 1940 were
college graduates; by 2000, the college graduation remained a minuscule
3.4 percent in this group of workers.
The bottom panel of table 1.2 reports the trends in the education distri-
bution for working women. The trends are similar to those reported for the
various groups of working men, though not as dramatic. For example, the
high school dropout rate of native women dropped by 44 percentage points
between 1940 and 2000 (from 50.6 to 6.5 percent), as compared to the al-
most 60 percentage point drop experienced by native men. Similarly, the
high school dropout rate for Mexican immigrant women dropped by 28
percentage points (from 84.5 to 57.0 percent), as compared to the 32 per-
centage point drop experienced by Mexican immigrant men. These data
patterns presage a systematic ﬁnding in much of our analysis: the diﬀer-
ences exhibited by the various groups of working women mirror those ex-
hibited among the respective groups of working men but are less extreme.
As a result of this similarity, much of the discussion that follows will focus
on the trends observed in the sample of working men (even though many
of the tables will report the respective statistics for working women). By fo-
cusing on the trends exhibited by working men, we can avoid the diﬃcult
conceptual and econometric issues introduced by the interpretation of skill
and wage trends for working women during a period of rapidly rising fe-
male labor force participation rates.
Finally, table 1.3 illustrates the changing occupational distribution of
Mexican immigrants by listing the “Top Ten” occupations employing these
workers. The IPUMS data recode the very diﬀerent occupation codes used
by the various censuses into a single occupation categorization based on
the 1950 Census deﬁnitions. We use this simplifying recoding to compare
the occupation distribution of workers across censuses.
Not surprisingly, such low-skill occupations as laborers, farm laborers,
gardeners and cooks, dominate the occupational distribution of Mexican












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.immigrants. It is worth noting, however, that there seems to be much less
occupational clustering among Mexican immigrants in the late 1900s than
there was at the beginning of the century. In 1900, for example, almost two-
thirds of Mexican immigrant men were employed as laborers or farm la-
borers. In 2000, the largest concentration of Mexican immigrant men is
found in operatives (not elsewhere classiﬁed), which employs “only” 15.5
percent of the workers.
1.2.3 Trends in the Relative Wage
The growing disadvantage in the educational attainment of Mexican im-
migrants clearly implies a growing disadvantage in relative wages. Begin-
ning in 1940, the IPUMS reports the worker’s annual earned income in the
year prior to the census. We divided the reported annual earned income by
the reported number of weeks worked (in the subsample of workers who re-
ported a positive number of weeks worked) to calculate the weekly wage for
each worker.11
Table 1.4 documents that the relative log weekly wage of both Mexican
and non-Mexican immigrants fell steeply between 1940 and 2000. Panel A
of the table reports the trend in the log weekly wage of male Mexican and
non-Mexican immigrants relative to the log weekly wage of native-born
working men. It is instructive to begin the discussion by observing the
trend in the relative log weekly wage of non-Mexican immigrants. Table 1.4
shows that there was a sizable and steady decline in the relative wage of
non-Mexican immigrants between 1940 and 2000. In 1940, the typical non-
Mexican immigrant man earned about .18 log points more than the typical
native worker. By 2000, the typical non-Mexican immigrant man earned
about .03 log points less than the typical native-born worker. This decline
in the relative immigrant economic performance of immigrants has been a
subject of intensive (and contentious) debate (Borjas 1985, 1995; Chiswick
1986; LaLonde and Topel 1992; Yuengert 1994).
The table also shows that, although the magnitude of the wage disad-
vantage of Mexican immigrant men is much larger than that of their non-
Mexican counterparts, there has not been a steady downward trend in rel-
ative economic performance among Mexican immigrants. For example,
the log weekly wage of Mexican immigrants was –.48 log points lower than
that of native-born workers in 1940. This wage disadvantage, in fact, nar-
rowed to around –.39 log points by 1970, before growing again to –.53 log
points in 2000. It is worth stressing that although the relative economic
performance of Mexican immigrants does not seem to have worsened sub-
stantially over the past few decades, Mexican immigrants have always
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11. The sample includes self-employed workers. The worker’s annual earned income is then
deﬁned as the sum of wage and salary income and self-employment income, except in 1940
when the Census does not report detailed information on self-employment income. Similar
trends are revealed when the analysis is restricted only to salaried workers.Table 1.4 Trends in immigrant wages relative to native-born workers
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Male workers
A. Unadjusted wage gap
Mexican immigrants –.475 –.385 –.365 –.390 –.408 –.544 –.533
(.022) (.030) (.016) (.014) (.004) (.003) (.002)
Non-Mexican immigrants .175 .131 .104 .072 –.022 –.004 –.034
(.005) (.007) (.005) (.005) (.002) (.002) (.002)
B. Adjusted wage gap, adjusts for 
education, age
Mexican immigrants –.453 –.352 –.249 –.205 –.148 –.149 –.144
(.020) (.028) (.015) (.013) (.003) (.003) (.002)
Non-Mexican immigrants .092 .093 .102 .035 –.048 –.042 –.073
(.004) (.007) (.004) (.004) (.002) (.002) (.001)
C. Adjusted wage gap, adjusts for 
education, age, state of residence
Mexican immigrants –.444 –.377 –.304 –.255 –.202 –.208 –.176
(.019) (.027) (.014) (.013) (.003) (.003) (.002)
Non-Mexican immigrants –.016 .019 .016 –.027 –.062 –.104 –.106
(.004) (.007) (.004) (.004) (.002) (.002) (.001)
Female workers
D. Unadjusted wage gap
Mexican immigrants –.329 –.193 –.335 –.217 –.135 –.316 –.401
(.056) (.068) (.033) (.025) (.005) (.004) (.003)
Non-Mexican immigrants .026 .065 .052 .057 .060 .081 .036
(.009) (.013) (.007) (.006) (.002) (.002) (.002)
E. Adjusted wage gap, adjusts for 
education, age
Mexican immigrants –.247 –.104 –.177 –.049 .035 –.015 –.074
(.051) (.064) (.031) (.023) (.005) (.004) (.003)
Non-Mexican immigrants .080 .123 .100 .078 .045 .072 .025
(.008) (.013) (.007) (.006) (.002) (.002) (.002)
F. Adjusted wage gap, adjusts for 
education, age, state of 
residence
Mexican immigrants –.246 –.132 –.230 –.094 –.038 –.120 –.137
(.050) (.062) (.031) (.023) (.005) (.004) (.003)
Non-Mexican immigrants –.013 .021 –.001 .010 .011 –.017 –.035
(.008) (.012) (.007) (.006) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The numbers of observations in the male regressions are as
follows: 208,729 in the 1940 Census; 79,824 in the 1950 Census; 362,823 in the 1960 Census; 393,653 in
the 1970 Census; 2,546,859 in the 1980 Census; 2,809,917 in the 1990 Census; and 3,164,510 in the 2000
Census. The numbers of observations in the female regressions are: 74,101 in the 1940 Census; 33,777 in
the 1950 Census; 163,027 in the 1960 Census; 227,736 in the 1970 Census; 1,961,549 in the 1980 Census;
2,405,910 in the 1990 Census; and 2,800,811 in the 2000 Census. The reported coeﬃcients are log wage
gaps relative to native-born workers.suﬀered a substantial handicap in the labor market. A log point diﬀerence
of –.53 implies an approximate 41 percent wage gap relative to natives for
Mexican immigrants, as compared to only a 3 percent wage gap for the
non-Mexican immigrant population in 2000.
As we showed earlier, there has been an increasing gap in educational at-
tainment between Mexican immigrants and native-born workers. It is of
interest to determine, therefore, whether diﬀerences in educational attain-
ment and other observed measures of human capital explain the sizable
wage gap between Mexican immigrants and native men. To illustrate the
key importance of observable socioeconomic characteristics in determin-
ing the relatively low wage of Mexican immigrants, we estimated the fol-
lowing generic regression model separately in each census:
(1) log wjt   Xjt t    tIjt   εjt,
where wjt gives the log weekly wage of worker j in year t; X is a vector of
socioeconomic characteristics (deﬁned below); and Ijt is a vector of two
variables indicating if worker j is a Mexican immigrant or a non-Mexican
immigrant. Depending on the speciﬁcation of the regression model, the
vector X can contain a vector of dummy variables indicating the worker’s
education (less than high school, high school graduate, some college, or
college graduate), a third-order polynomial in the worker’s age, and a vec-
tor of ﬁxed eﬀects indicating the state of residence.12
Panel B of table 1.4 reports the estimated coeﬃcients of the parameter
vector    when the vector of standardizing variables includes only the
worker’s education and age. The results are striking. In 1940, the observed
diﬀerence in socioeconomic characteristics, and particularly educational
attainment, explain almost nothing of the sizable wage gap between Mexi-
can immigrants and native-born men. The observed wage gap was –.475 log
points, and the adjusted wage gap was –.453. By 1970, the minimal set of
variables included in the vector X is an important determinant of the wage
gap. In 1970, the observed wage gap stood at –.390 log points, and the ad-
justed wage gap was –.205 so that the observed human capital variables ex-
plained roughly half of the observed wage gap. Beginning in 1980, the ad-
justed wage gap has remained stable at around –.15 log points so that a very
large fraction of the observed wage gap (over 70 percent of the –.53 wage
gap in 2000) can be attributed to diﬀerences in socioeconomic characteris-
tics, and particularly the very large diﬀerence in educational attainment.13
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12. This regression model can be easily expanded to allow for diﬀerent vectors of coeﬃ-
cients for the various groups. This more general speciﬁcation leads to results that are similar
to those reported in the paper. For simplicity, we choose to report the ﬁndings from the most
basic regression speciﬁcation.
13. The fact that age and educational attainment explain a large part of the wage gap in re-
cent decades but almost none of the gap in 1940 and 1950 is explained by the fact that, al-
though there was a large gap in educational attainment in the earlier years, Mexican immi-
grants were substantially older than native workers in 1940 and 1950 and roughly the sameIt also turns out that by 2000 the observed diﬀerences in human capital—
and again most particularly the observed diﬀerence in educational attain-
ment—explains practically all of the wage gap between non-Mexican
immigrants and Mexican immigrants. In 2000, for example, the adjusted
relative wage of non-Mexican immigrants is –.07 log points, in contrast to a
–.14 log point diﬀerence for Mexican immigrants. The .07 log point diﬀer-
ence in adjusted relative wages between the two groups of immigrant work-
ers stands in sharp contrast to the .50 log point diﬀerence in observed wages.
Put diﬀerently, practically the entire wage gap between the two groups of
immigrants can be explained through the fact that they diﬀer in their levels
of observed human capital—particularly educational attainment.
Panel C of table 1.4 replicates the regression analysis after adding in a
vector of ﬁxed eﬀects indicating the worker’s state of residence. These ﬁxed
eﬀects could conceivably be very important as there is a great deal of geo-
graphic clustering among immigrants, and the states where immigrants
tend to cluster may be high-wage states. The regression coeﬃcients re-
ported in the table, however, indicate that the quantitative changes in the
size of the adjusted wage gaps are relatively small so that none of the key
ﬁndings reported previously are aﬀected by the inclusion of the state ﬁxed
eﬀects.
Finally, the bottom panels of table 1.4 replicate the analysis using the
sample of female workers. As noted earlier, the trends tend to be quite sim-
ilar to those found among working men. In 2000, the relative wage of fe-
male Mexican immigrants stood at –.40 log points, as compared to an ad-
vantage of  .04 log points for female non-Mexican immigrants. Much of
the wage disadvantage experienced by Mexican immigrant women, how-
ever, disappears once the regression model controls for diﬀerences in edu-
cational attainment among the groups. In particular, the –.40 log point
wage gap falls to a –.07 wage gap when the regression model controls for
educational attainment and age. In other words, a minimal set of skill char-
acteristics explains about 80 percent of the wage gap between Mexican and
native women.
1.2.4 Cohort Eﬀects
The literature that documents the trends in immigrant skills stresses the
importance of cohort and assimilation eﬀects in generating the secular
trends in the wage gap between immigrants and natives reported in table
1.4. After all, the wage of Mexican (or non-Mexican) immigrants may be
changing over time either because—even at the time of entry—newer
waves of immigrants have diﬀerent skills than earlier waves or because ear-
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age as natives after 1970. For example, the mean age of Mexican immigrants in 1940 was 45.9
years, as compared to 36.4 years for natives. In 2000, the mean age of the two groups is 40.7
and 40.5 years, respectively.lier waves are acquiring valuable skills as they adapt to the U.S. labor mar-
ket. It is of great interest to investigate the relative importance of both of
these factors to examine the wage evolution experienced by the Mexican-
born workforce in the United States.
Instead of developing a parametric model to summarize the various
trends, we use a simple framework that attempts to characterize the under-
lying trends without imposing any structure on the data. Consider, in par-
ticular, the trend in the relative wage of immigrants who, as of the time of
the census, have been in the United States fewer than f ﬁve years.14The trend
in the relative wage of these immigrants would identify the cohort eﬀect
that characterizes the most recent wave observed in each of the censuses.15
Panel A of table 1.5 reports the relative wage of these newly arrived Mexi-
can and non-Mexican immigrants in each of the censuses where the data
are available.
The data clearly suggest a steady decline in the relative wage of succes-
sive waves of newly arrived Mexican immigrants from 1940 through 1990.
The most recently arrived Mexican immigrant wave enumerated in the
1940 Census (i.e., the 1945–1949 arrivals) earned –.34 log points less than
natives in 1940. By 1990, the latest wave of Mexican immigrants enumer-
ated in that census earned .81 log points less than natives. This decline was
reversed slightly in the 1990s. In 2000, the latest wave of Mexican immi-
grants earned .76 log points less than native workers. To provide some per-
spective, note that a –.76 log wage gap implies a 53 percent wage diﬀeren-
tial between Mexican immigrants and natives at the time of arrival.
A similar decline in the relative wage of successive immigrant cohorts—
although the magnitude of the relative wage disadvantage is not as large—
is clear in the sample of non-Mexican immigrants. In 1940, the most re-
cently arrived non-Mexican immigrants earned .10 more log points than
native workers; by 1970, the relative wage of the most recent cohort stood
at –.16; by 1990 it stood at –29. This long-term decline in the relative wage
of newly arrived immigrants was reversed in the 1990s. In 2000, the newly
arrived non-Mexican immigrants earned .20 log points less than native
workers.
The relative wage trends of successive immigrant cohorts of both Mexi-
can and non-Mexican immigrants, therefore, imply a very similar trend in
cohort eﬀects in the period between 1940 and 1990—a decline in the rela-
tive earnings of newly arrived immigrants from 1940 through 1990 and
then a reversal in the 1990s. This reversal was relatively modest for Mexi-
can immigrants and quite sharp for non-Mexican immigrants.
Two points are worth emphasizing about these trends. First, although
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14. The 1950 Census does not provide this information so that the relative wage of the most
recently arrived ﬁve-year cohort cannot be measured.
15. This assertion, of course, assumes that the period eﬀect is neutral between the immi-
grant population and the baseline reference group.Table 1.5 Trends in the relative wage of newly arrived immigrants
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Male workers
A. Unadjusted wage gap
Mexican immigrants –.342 –.526 –.593 –.647 –.812 –.764
(.258) (.044) (.031) (.007) (.006) (.004)
Non-Mexican immigrants .101 –.074 –.160 –.218 –.289 –.203
(.042) (.014) (.011) (0.004) (0.004) (.003)
B. Adjusted wage gap, adjusts for 
education, age
Mexican immigrants –.408 –.316 –.254 –.214 –.201 –.164
(.230) (.039) (.028) (.006) (.005) (.004)
Non-Mexican immigrants –.004 –.077 –.177 –.210 –.200 –.149
(.037) (.013) (.010) (.004) (.003) (.003)
C. Adjusted wage gap, adjusts for 
education, age, state of residence
Mexican immigrants –.459 –.396 –.325 –.272 –.277 –.187
(.219) (.038) (.027) (.006) (.005) (.004)
Non-Mexican immigrants –.111 –0.166 –.238 –.230 –.272 –.180
(.035) (.012) (.010) (.004) (.003) (.003)
Female workers
D. Unadjusted wage gap
Mexican immigrants –.557 –.286 –.248 –.503 –.544
(.084) (.056) (.011) (.010) (.007)
Non-Mexican immigrants –.125 –.046 .018 –.040 –.137 –.150
(.053) (.019) (.014) (.005) (.005) (.004)
E. Adjusted wage gap, adjusts for 
education, age
Mexican immigrants –.334 –.072 .001 –.092 –.096
(.079) (.053) (.011) (.009) (.006)
Non-Mexican immigrants –.004 .018 .054 –.025 –.078 –.100
(.048) (.018) (.013) (.005) (.004) (.004)
F. Adjusted wage gap, adjusts for 
education, age, state of residence
Mexican immigrants –.395 –.133 –.078 –.214 –.144
(.077) (.052) (.011) (.009) (.006)
Non-Mexican immigrants –.119 –.086 –.022 –.066 –.181 –.155
(.046) (.017) (.013) (.005) (.004) (.004)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. A newly arrived immigrant has been in the United States ﬁve
years or less as of the time of the Census. The numbers of observations in the male regressions are as fol-
lows: 186,314 in the 1940 Census; 343,028 in the 1960 Census; 377,656 in the 1970 Census; 2,416,854 in
the 1980 Census; 2,612,394 in the 1990 Census; and 2,820,033 in the 2000 Census. The numbers of ob-
servations in the female regressions are as follows: 69,147 in the 1940 Census; 154,868 in the 1960 Cen-
sus; 217,844 in the 1970 Census; 1,856,973 in the 1980 Census; 2,250,119 in the 1990 Census; and
2,541,595 in the 2000 Census. The reported wage coeﬃcients are log wage gaps relative to native-born
workers.the U-shaped trends in cohort eﬀects are very similar between the two
groups of immigrants, the magnitude of the relative wage disadvantage at
the time of entry is far greater for the Mexican population. In 2000, the typ-
ical newly arrived Mexican immigrant earned 53.4 percent less than the
typical native worker, as compared to an 18.4 percent wage disadvantage
for non-Mexican immigrants.
Second, a recent study by Borjas and Friedberg (2004) documents that
the uptick in the cohort eﬀect for (all) immigrants who arrived in the late
1990s can be explained in terms of a simple story that has signiﬁcant pol-
icy relevance. In particular, the uptick documented in the entire sample of
immigrants disappears when the relatively small number of immigrants
who are employed as computer scientists and engineers is excluded from
theanalysis.16In both 1980 and 1990, fewer than 5 percent of the newly ar-
rived immigrants worked in these high-tech occupations. By 2000, how-
ever, 11.1 percent of the newly arrived immigrants worked in these occu-
pations.
Although the census data do not provide information on the type of visa
immigrants used to enter the country, it is probably not a coincidence that
this increase in the relative number of high-tech immigrants occurred at the
same time that the size of the H-1B visa program grew substantially. This
program allows employers to sponsor the entry of temporary workers in
specialty occupations. In fact, 70 percent of the workers entering the coun-
try with an H-1B visa in 2000 are employed either in computer-related oc-
cupations or in engineering (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service
2002). Between 1990 and 1994, about 100,000 H-1B visas were granted
each year. In 1996, this number increased to 144,548; to 240,947 in 1998;
and to 302,326 in 1999 (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, var-
ious issues). It seems, therefore, that the insourcing of high-tech workers
through the H-1B program reversed the long-standing trend of declining
relative skills in successive cohorts of new immigrants.
It is extremely unlikely, however, that the H-1B program can explain the
modest uptick observed in the cohort eﬀects for Mexican immigrants dur-
ing the late 1990s. After all, the number of Mexican-born workers in the
newly arrived sample in the 2000 Census who are employed as computer
scientists or engineers is minuscule (0.6 percent for Mexican immigrants as
compared to 9.5 percent for non-Mexican immigrants). It seems, there-
fore, that the improvement in the relative economic status of newly arrived
Mexican immigrants in the late 1990s may reﬂect either an increase in the
overall skills of the sample or a period eﬀect that is not yet fully understood
(although it is well known that wages for low-skill workers increased
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16. The occupation codes used to deﬁne the sample of computer scientists and engineers in
each census are: 80–93 in 1960; 3, 4, and 6–23 in 1970; 44–59, 64, and 229 in 1970 and 1980;
100–111 and 132–153 in 2000.markedly during this period as shown, for example, in Autor, Katz, and
Kearney 2005).
Panel B of table 1.5 continues the analysis of the cohort eﬀects by re-
porting the adjusted wage diﬀerential between the sample of newly arrived
immigrants and native-born workers when the regression model includes
the age and education variables, and panel C adds the state of residence
ﬁxed eﬀects. The adjusted log wage diﬀerentials reported in the table are
obtained by estimating a regression model similar to that presented in
equation (1), but including only the samples of native workers and the most
recently arrived immigrants in each census. The comparison of the ad-
justed (from panel B) and unadjusted log wage gaps reveal a number of in-
teresting ﬁndings. First, a minimal vector of skill characteristics explains a
great deal of the wage gap between newly arrived Mexican immigrants and
native workers, but explains only a relatively small part of the wage gap be-
tween non-Mexican immigrants and natives. For example, in 2000 there
was a –.76 unadjusted log wage gap between recent Mexican immigrants
and natives. Adjusting for diﬀerences in education and age reduces the
wage gap to –.16 log points so that the observed skill characteristics explain
about 80 percent of the observed wage gap. In contrast, the observed wage
gap for recent non-Mexican immigrants is –.20 log points, and the adjusted
wage gap is –.16 log points so that diﬀerences in education and age explain
only about one-ﬁfth of the observed wage gap in this population.
A second important insight provided by table 1.5 is that the very large
wage gap between non-Mexican and newly arrived Mexican immigrants is
almost entirely due to diﬀerences in educational attainment and age, par-
ticularly in recent years. In 2000, for example, the regression coeﬃcients
imply that there was an unadjusted wage gap of –.56 log points between
Mexican and non-Mexican immigrants but that adjusting for education
and age reduced this wage gap to only about –.015 log points. In short, the
regressions yield the important conclusion that the reason that recent
Mexican immigrants earn far less than their non-Mexican counterparts
appears to have little to do with the fact that they are Mexican but has al-
most everything to do with the fact that they are far less educated than their
counterparts.
It is worth noting that the trend in relative wages between immigrants
and native workers may also be reﬂecting diﬀerential period eﬀects on the
wages of the various groups, particularly toward the latter part of the pe-
riod under study. After all, there were historic changes in the U.S. wage
structure during the 1980s and 1990s, and these changes did not aﬀect all
skill groups equally (Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2005; Katz and Murphy
1992; Murphy and Welch 1992). There was, for instance, a sizable increase
in the wage gap between highly educated and less-educated workers. Be-
cause Mexican immigrants are relatively unskilled, the changes in the wage
structure imply that the relative wage of Mexican immigrants would have
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grants had remained constant.
We use a simple approach to show that the wage trends documented in
tables 1.4 and 1.5 are not greatly aﬀected by the changes in the wage struc-
ture. In particular, we calculated the median wage of Mexican or non-
Mexican immigrants in each of the census years starting in 1960 and com-
puted the fraction of native workers whose wage lies below the immigrant
median. This approach, of course, results in a statistic that marks the place-
ment of the median Mexican or non-Mexican immigrant in the native wage
distribution. As shown in table 1.6, the results of this analysis strongly re-
semble those provided by the trends in the mean log wage gap between im-
migrant and native workers. Among male workers, for example, the trend
in the log wage gap between newly arrived Mexican immigrants and native
workers suggested a general decline in the relative skills of the successive
immigrant cohorts between 1960 and 2000. Similarly, the percentile anal-
ysis reported in table 1.6 shows that the median newly arrived Mexican im-
migrant in 1960 placed at the 17th percentile of the native wage distribu-
tion, while the median newly arrived Mexican immigrant in 2000 placed at
the 12th percentile.
Table 1.6 also reports the percentile placement of the immigrant work-
ers after adjusting the data for diﬀerences in educational attainment, age,
and state of residence between immigrants and natives. These adjusted
placements are calculated by obtaining the residuals from a log weekly
wage regression estimated separately by census year and gender. The ad-
justed placement reported in the table gives the fraction of native workers
who have a residual from this regression below that of the median residual
in the samples of Mexican or non-Mexican workers. As with the trends in
the adjusted mean wage gap, the trend in the adjusted percentile placement
suggest a decline in the relative economic status of newly arrived non-
Mexican immigrants from 1960 through 1990 and an increase in the rela-
tive status of newly arrived Mexican immigrants throughout the entire
1960–2000 period.17
1.2.5 Economic Assimilation
The 1960–2000 Census data can also be used to measure the extent of
“economic assimilation,” the improvement in the relative wage of a speciﬁc
immigrant cohort over time.18 We deﬁne an immigrant cohort in terms of
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17. It is worth noting that the change in the wage of entry cohorts over time is distorted by
changes in census coverage—particularly as more-recent censuses have attempted to count a
greater fraction of the population of illegal immigrant.
18. It is believed that as many as one-third of the immigrants in the United States eventu-
ally return to their origin countries. Suppose that the return migrants are disproportionately
composed of workers with lower than average wages. The intercensal tracking of a particular
immigrant cohort would then indicate an improvement in relative wages even if no wage con-
vergence is taking place. Alternatively, if the return migrants are the successes, the rate ofcalendar year of arrival and age at arrival. One can then use the decennial
censuses to calculate the wage diﬀerential between newly arrived immi-
grants and similarly aged natives as of 1970; to recalculate the wage gap be-
tween these same two groups ten years later in the 1980 Census when the
workers are ten years older; and to recalculate it again later in the 1990 and
2000 Censuses when the groups are twenty and thirty years older, respec-
tively.
Consider initially the economic assimilation experienced by non-
Mexican immigrants. Table 1.7 reports the economic assimilation trends
for various cohorts of this group of immigrants. Figure 1.3summarizes the
results by illustrating the assimilation trends for workers who arrived in the
United States when they were twenty-ﬁve to thirty-four years old. To sim-
plify the presentation, much of our discussion will focus directly on the
groups illustrated in f ﬁgure 1.3.19
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Table 1.6 Placement of median immigrant in native wage distribution
Percentile placement of median  Percentile placement of median 
Mexican immigrant non-Mexican immigrant
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Male
All immigrant 26.2 22.0 23.6 19.7 19.0 53.6 53.4 47.7 47.8 45.5
Recent immigrants 17.0 14.7 14.1 12.4 12.3 40.5 34.2 30.3 27.7 32.8
Maleb
All immigrants 26.7 27.1 33.4 34.9 37.8 49.6 46.7 43.6 41.2 41.9
Recent immigrants 19.5 22.4 28.0 29.8 35.9 35.9 29.0 29.6 28.3 36.6
Femalea
All immigrants 27.5 33.5 38.1 30.6 25.9 50.7 52.1 52.4 52.3 49.7
Recent immigrants 19.8 31.7 32.1 22.8 20.9 43.7 47.4 44.1 37.8 36.0
Femaleb
All immigrants 29.0 39.1 42.9 38.6 37.6 46.6 48.0 48.5 46.2 45.7
Recent immigrants 21.7 36.5 40.3 32.4 36.4 41.6 42.8 41.1 34.1 36.0
aUnadjusted placement: fraction of the relevant native workforce that has a wage below that of the me-
dian of the Mexican or non-Mexican immigrant.
bAdjusted placement: the fraction of the relevant native workforce that has a residual from a wage
regression that lies below the median residual of the Mexican or non-Mexican immigrant, where the
regression includes a vector of educational attainment ﬁxed eﬀects, a third-order polynomial in the
worker’s age, and a vector of ﬁxed eﬀects indicating the worker’s state of residence.
wage convergence would be underestimated. Because of data limitations, the selection mech-
anism generating the return migration ﬂow is not well understood. An important exception is
the work of Ramos (1992), who analyzes the return migration decisions of Puerto Ricans liv-
ing in the United States.
19. The assimilation proﬁle of the cohort of immigrants that entered the United States be-
tween 1955 and 1959 is incomplete because the cohort cannot be identiﬁed in the 1980 and
1990 Censuses.Consider the group of non-Mexican immigrants who arrived in the late
1960s at a relatively young age, when they were twenty-ﬁve to thirty-four
years old. Figure 1.3 shows that these immigrants earned .11 log points less
than comparably aged native workers at the time of entry. Let’s now move
forward in time ten years to 1980, when both the immigrants and the na-
tives are thirty-ﬁve to forty-four years old. The wage disadvantage experi-
enced by these immigrants has now been reversed, and the non-Mexican
immigrant relative wage is .01 log points greater than that of comparably
aged native workers. The economic assimilation of this group continues
during the 1980s so that the 1990 Census shows that the wage of this group
of non-Mexican immigrants is about .10 log points greater than that of
comparably aged natives. Finally, the data reveal relatively little additional
wage growth during the 1990s as both native and immigrant workers near
retirement. In sum, the process of economic assimilation exhibited by this
cohort reduced the initial wage disadvantage of these immigrants by just
over 20 log points over a thirty-year period—with most of the wage growth
occurring in the ﬁrst twenty years after immigration. Because this immi-
grant cohort had a relatively high wage at the time of entry, the process of
economic assimilation allowed the immigrants to narrow the wage disad-
vantage by catching up and overtaking comparable native workers.
The experience of other groups of non-Mexican immigrants who arrived
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Table 1.7 Evolution of relative wage of non-Mexican immigrants over time (relative
to native workers)
Year of entry Age at migration 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
1955–1959 25–34 –0.039 0.127
35–44 –0.080 0.067
45–54 –0.122 –0.005
1965–1969 5–14 0.087 0.110
15–24 –0.019 0.062 0.037
25–34 –0.107 0.014 0.101 0.124




25–34 –0.176 –0.017 –0.018







Note: The “age at migration” reﬂects the age of the workers at the time of the Census imme-
diately following the arrival of the immigrant cohort.at a relatively young age (between twenty-ﬁve and thirty-four) yields
roughly the same type of wage convergence regardless of the calendar year
when they arrived in the United States. Consider, for instance, the non-
Mexican workers who arrived in the United States in the late 1970s. They
started out with a wage disadvantage of .18 log points, and this disadvan-
tage had disappeared within a decade. In short, the evidence suggests that
non-Mexican immigrants experience reasonably rapid wage convergence,
with the process of economic assimilation increasing the relative wage of
the non-Mexican immigrants who arrived at around age thirty by 20 log
points over the ﬁrst two decades.
Contrast now these assimilation rates with those found in the population
of similarly aged (i.e., twenty-ﬁve–thirty-four at the time of arrival) Mexi-
can immigrants, as reported in table 1.8 and illustrated in ﬁgure 1.4. The
ﬁgure reveals far less evidence of a consistent pattern of economic im-
provement for a particular cohort of immigrants over time. Although there
is a great deal of variability in the data (perhaps due to sampling error or
to period eﬀects), the age-earnings proﬁles for the various cohorts of Mex-
ican immigrants represented in the ﬁgure provide little evidence that these
immigrants experience systematic and persistent wage growth as they ac-
cumulate experience in the U.S. labor market. To be speciﬁc, consider the
evolution of relative wages for the Mexican immigrants who arrived in the
late 1960s. They experienced a –.59 log point wage disadvantage at the time
of entry; this disadvantage was narrowed substantially to –.45 log points 
by 1980, but then it began to grow again, to –.54 log points in 1990 and –.52
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Fig. 1.3 Wage growth of non-Mexican immigrant cohorts over time, relative to
natives (relative wage of immigrants who arrived when they were twenty-ﬁve–
thirty-four years old)log points in 2000, as the group of older workers now approached retire-
ment age. Similarly, the sample of Mexican immigrants who arrived in the
late 1970s, for example, experienced a ﬂat assimilation path over their ob-
servable life cycle. In short, the evidence clearly indicates that the path of
economic assimilation experienced by Mexican immigrants diﬀers strik-
ingly from that experienced by non-Mexican immigrants.
Tables 1.7 and 1.8 report more detailed evidence on the rate of economic
assimilation for other cohorts of non-Mexican and Mexican immigrants
who arrived at diﬀerent ages. The evidence clearly suggests that immi-
grants (regardless of whether they are Mexican) who enter the United
States at older ages enter with a greater disadvantage and experience less
economic assimilation. For example, the relative wage of Mexican immi-
grants who arrived in the United States in the late 1970s when they were
forty-ﬁve to ﬁfty-four years old was –.82 log points at the time of entry. This
group’s relative wage had improved slightly to –.75 log points by 1990. Sim-
ilarly, the relative wage of comparably aged non-Mexican immigrants who
entered the country in the late 1970s was –.29 at the time of entry and had
improved modestly to –.18 log points by 1990.
In contrast, the data indicate that immigrants who enter the United
States as children have a much smaller wage disadvantage when they ﬁrst
enter the labor market. Consider, for instance, the wage experience of non-
Mexican immigrants who entered the United States in the late 1960s when
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Table 1.8 Evolution of relative wage of Mexican immigrants over time (relative to
native workers)
Year of entry Age at migration 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
1955–1959 25–34 –0.381 –0.352
35–44 –0.626 –0.381
45–54 –0.835 –0.660
1965–1969 5–14 –0.173 –0.271
15–24 –0.231 –0.360 –0.440
25–34 –0.593 –0.445 –0.537 –0.517




25–34 –0.543 –0.603 –0.591







Note: See notes to table 1.7.they were ﬁve to fourteen years old. These persons are ﬁrst observed in the
labor market in 1990 when they are twenty-ﬁve to thirty-four years old.
Their entry wage stands at  .09 log points. Similarly, the wage of the re-
spective cohort of Mexican immigrants is –.17 log points in 1990. Al-
though Mexican immigrants still suﬀer a disadvantage, the size of the dis-
advantage is far smaller than that experienced by groups of Mexican
immigrants who entered the United States at older ages (and, as we shall
see momentarily, is roughly similar to the wage disadvantage experienced
by U.S.-born workers of Mexican ancestry).
A number of data and conceptual problems suggest that we should in-
terpret the evolution of relative wages for speciﬁc cohorts of Mexican im-
migrants with some caution. For instance, it could be argued that the rates
of economic assimilation convergence reported in table 1.8 are misleading
because they compare the wage growth experienced by the typical Mexican
immigrant with the wage growth experienced by the typical U.S.-born
worker. As we have seen, however, the educational attainment of the typi-
cal Mexican immigrant is much lower than the educational attainment of
the typical native worker. In 1990, for example, only 4 percent of male na-
tive workers had eight or fewer years of schooling, as compared to 57 per-
cent of male Mexican immigrants.
This huge diﬀerence in the human capital of the two groups suggests that
it may be of interest to compare the wage growth experienced by Mexican
immigrants with the wage growth experienced by natives who face some-
what similar economic opportunities. Figure 1.5 replicates the economic
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Fig. 1.4 Wage growth of Mexican immigrant cohorts over time, relative to natives
(relative wage of immigrants who arrived when they were twenty-ﬁve–thirty-four
years old)assimilation analysis by using a diﬀerent native group as the reference
group—namely the sample of native-born workers who report they have
Mexicanancestry.20The information on Mexican ancestry is available on a
consistent basis only beginning with the 1980 Census so that this phase of
the research focuses on the 1980–2000 period.
It is of interest to contrast the age-earnings proﬁles illustrated in ﬁgures
1.4 and 1.5. This contrast reveals two important ﬁndings. First, there is a
much smaller wage gap between Mexican immigrants and Mexican natives
than between Mexican immigrants and the typical native-born worker. For
example, recently arrived Mexican immigrants aged twenty-ﬁve–thirty-
four in 1980 earned .50 log points less than the typical young native worker
at the time, but earned only –.04 log points less than the typical U.S.-born
worker of Mexican ancestry. Second, although there is a great deal of vari-
ability in the age-earnings proﬁles, there is somewhat more evidence of a
catching up eﬀect for Mexican immigrants relative to U.S. natives of Mex-
ican ancestry. Figure 1.5, in fact, suggests that Mexican immigrants (at
least starting with those arriving in the 1970s) experience roughly a .10 log
point catching up eﬀect during their ﬁrst decade in the United States.
There is even stronger evidence of wage convergence when the Mexican
immigrants are compared to native workers who have the same educa-
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20. The next section discusses the construction of the sample of Mexican-born workers in
the post-1980 censuses in detail.
Fig. 1.5 Wage growth of Mexican immigrant cohorts over time, relative to Mexi-
can natives (relative wage of immigrants who arrived when they were twenty-ﬁve–
thirty-four years old)tional attainment. As shown in the preceding, the fraction of Mexican men
who are high school dropouts hovered around 90 percent prior to 1960 and
was still around 63 percent even by 2000. It is of interest, therefore, to con-
trast how the bulk of the Mexican immigrant workforce fares relative to the
(shrinking) sample of native high school dropouts. Figure 1.6 shows that
the wage of Mexican immigrant high school dropouts increases signiﬁ-
cantly during their ﬁrst decade in the United States relative to that of native
high school dropouts. For example, the newly arrived immigrants aged
twenty-ﬁve–thirty-four in 1970 earned –.46 log points less than native high
school dropouts, but this wage gap had narrowed to –.17 log points by
1980. Note, however, that this wage convergence slows down considerably
(if not stops altogether) after ten years in the United States so that Mexi-
can immigrants earn less than comparably aged native high school drop-
outs even after twenty years in the country.
In addition to the problems introduced by the choice of a baseline group,
it is worth stressing that the interpretation of the wage evolution experi-
enced by a particular Mexican immigrant cohort as a measure of economic
assimilation ignores the fact that the sample composition of the Mexican
immigrant sample is likely changing over time because of return migration.
The proximity of Mexico to the United States, and the presumed large
back-and-forth migration ﬂows between the two countries, suggests that
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Fig. 1.6 Wage growth of Mexican immigrant cohorts over time, relative to native
worker, restricted to sample of high school dropouts (relative wage of immigrants
who arrived when they were twenty-ﬁve–thirty-four years old)
Note: The samples of Mexican immigrants and native workers are restricted to male workers
who are high school dropouts.Mexican immigrants may have relatively large outmigration rates.21 It is
evident that the use of synthetic cohorts created by matching particular
groups of workers across census surveys may not lead to an accurate as-
sessment of economic assimilation for a population that has a large tran-
sient component.22
Suppose, for instance, that the return migrants are disproportionately
composed of workers who have lower than average wages. The intercensal
tracking of a particular immigrant cohort (deﬁned in terms of calendar
year of entry and age at migration) would then indicate an improvement in
relative wages even if no wage convergence is taking place. Alternatively,
the rate of wage convergence would be underestimated if the return mi-
grants are the successes.
The United States does not collect any information on either the size or
the skill composition of the outmigrant ﬂow. As a result, the available cen-
sus data cannot conclusively determine the biases introduced by selective
return migration on the observed rate of economic assimilation. Neverthe-
less, there are relatively simple ways of ascertaining the potential impor-
tance of this bias. For example, let w  0 be the relative log weekly wage of a
cohort of Mexican immigrants at the time of entry (t 0), and let w1
Sbe the
relative log weekly wage of the sample of survivors in the following period
(that is, the relative wage of those immigrants who chose to remain in the
United States). Assume that there is no sample attrition in the native-born
population and that a fraction r of the immigrants will return to Mexico
between t   0 and t   1. We can then write the observed rate of wage con-
vergence for this particular cohort of immigrants as
(2) w1
S   w  0   w1
S   [(1   r) w0
S   rw0
R],
where w0
S is the average relative entry wage of immigrants who remained in
the United States and w0
R is the average relative entry wage of the immi-
grants who returned to Mexico. It is instructive to rewrite equation (2) as
(3) w1
S   w  0   (w1
S   w0
S)   r(w0
S   w0
R),
which shows the relation between the observedrate of wage growth and the
true rate of wage growth (w1
S – w0
S) actually experienced by the sample of
survivors. The observed rate of wage growth is a biased measure of the true
rate of wage convergence as long as the skill composition of the sample of
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21. Borjas and Bratsberg (1996), for example, estimate that about 25.9 percent of the legal
Mexican immigrants who arrived between 1970 and 1974 had left the United States by 1980.
This outmigration rate compares to a rate of 21.5 percent for all legal immigrants who arrived
between 1970 and 1974.
22. The multiple border crossings made by many Mexican immigrants raises issues con-
cerning the accuracy of their responses to the census question on year of arrival in the United
States (Redstone and Massey 2004).survivors diﬀers from that of the sample of return migrants (that is, as long
as w0
S   w0
R).
We do not have any direct empirical evidence indicating the extent to
which the entry wage of Mexican immigrants who remain in the United
States diﬀers from the entry wage of Mexican immigrants who return to
Mexico. Equation (3), however, suggests that the numerical importance of
the bias introduced by nonrandom return migration will not be very large
for reasonable parameter values. Suppose, for instance, that the rate-of-
return migration among Mexican immigrants who were enumerated by the
U.S. Census at some point of their U.S. sojourn is as high as 30 percent. If
the wage diﬀerential between the Mexicans who remain in the United
States and those who leave is on the order of .2 log points (favoring the im-
migrants who return to Mexico), equation (3) then indicates that the true
rate of wage convergence is about 6 log points higher than the observed rate
of wage convergence. The data in table 1.8, however, suggest that there
would still be relatively little evidence of substantial wage convergence even
if we add 6 log points to the wage growth experienced by the surviving
Mexican immigrants. In short, it is very unlikely that the bulk of the Mex-
ican immigrant inﬂux will ever reach wage parity with the native-born
workforce.
1.3 Native-Born Workers of Mexican Ancestry
As noted earlier, beginning with the 1980 Census, we can observe the so-
cioeconomic characteristics of native-born persons who are of Hispanic
origin and who in addition claim that their Hispanic ancestry is of Mexi-
can origin. The number of native-born workers of Mexican ancestry in the
U.S. workforce has grown rapidly in the past twenty years and is inevitably
going to grow even faster in the future. As a result, it is of great interest 
to determine the skills and characteristics of these workers in the labor
market. Note that this population does not necessarily consist of only
second-generation workers, as many workers of higher-order generations
may claim Mexican ancestry. Nevertheless, the entry of many second-
generation workers of Mexican ancestry in the near future is bound to lead
to a substantial increase in the demographic and economic importance of
this population in the U.S. labor market.
There has been a rapid growth in the size of the population of native-
born workers who are of Mexican ancestry in the past two decades. In
1980, 2.3 percent of the native-born male workforce and 2.3 percent of the
native-born female workforce was of Mexican ancestry. By 2000, these sta-
tistics had increased to 3.1 and 3.0 percent. It is of interest to note that if
one combines the population of Mexican-born workers with that of U.S.-
born workers of Mexican ancestry, the 2000 Census indicates that these
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United States and 5.4 percent of the female workforce. These statistics
stand in sharp contrast to the data in 1980, where only 3.5 percent of the
male workforce and 2.9 percent of the female workforce could be classiﬁed
as of Mexican origin.
Table 1.9 documents the sizable diﬀerence in the distributions of educa-
tional attainment between native-born Mexicans and other native-born
workers. Like their immigrant counterparts, native-born Mexicans have
disproportionately large high school dropout rates and disproportionately
low rates of college graduation. In 2000, for example, 21.0 percent of
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Table 1.9 Distribution of educational attainment for Mexican native-born workers
1980 1990 2000
Male workers
Native-born of Mexican ancestry
High school dropouts 45.5 27.6 21.0
High school graduates 33.4 38.6 40.0
Some college 14.3 24.7 27.7
College graduates 6.7 9.1 11.3
All other native-born workers
High school dropouts 23.3 12.5 8.3
High school graduates 39.3 35.9 34.3
Some college 16.8 26.7 29.5
College graduates 20.6 24.9 27.9
Mexican immigrants
High school dropouts 77.2 70.4 63.0
High school graduates 14.3 19.0 25.1
Some college 5.7 7.8 8.5
College graduates 2.9 2.8 3.4
Female workers
Native-born of Mexican ancestry
High school dropouts 39.6 23.0 16.5
High school graduates 42.0 41.1 38.4
Some college 13.4 27.2 32.1
College graduates 5.0 8.7 13.0
All other native-born workers
High school dropouts 18.8 9.4 6.2
High school graduates 47.4 38.6 32.6
Some college 18.1 30.0 33.5
College graduates 15.8 22.0 27.7
Mexican immigrants
High school dropouts 72.9 64.7 57.0
High school graduates 17.7 21.9 26.6
Some college 7.0 10.5 11.8
College graduates 2.4 3.0 4.5
Note: All statistics are calculated using the sample of workers aged eighteen–sixty-four.native-born Mexicans were high school dropouts, and only 11.3 percent
were college graduates. This contrasts strikingly with the 8.3 percent of
native-born non-Mexicans who were high school dropouts and 27.9 per-
cent who were college graduates. It is worth stressing that although native-
born Mexicans have relatively low educational attainment (relative to
other native-born workers), they are far more educated than the Mexican
immigrant workforce, where dropout rates are around 63 percent in 2000.
The sizable diﬀerences in the educational attainment (as well as in the
occupations) of Mexican native workers and other natives inevitably lead
to equally sizable diﬀerences in log weekly wages between the two groups.
We use the generic regression framework given by equation (1) to estimate
the adjusted wage diﬀerentials separately in each of the censuses since
1980. We expand the immigration status variable to include dummy vari-
ables indicating if the worker is native-born of Mexican ancestry, an immi-
grant of Mexican origin, a non-Mexican immigrant, and a native-born
worker of non-Mexican ancestry (the omitted group).
Panel A of table 1.10 reports the trend in the unadjusted relative log
weekly wage between the various groups and the baseline group of non-
Mexican native born workers. In 1980, the unadjusted log weekly wage of
Mexican immigrants was .41 log points below that of non-Mexican natives.
By 2000, this gap had grown to –.54 log points. It turns out that the eco-
nomic status of native-born workers of Mexican ancestry also deteriorated
signiﬁcantly over this period, from –.24 log points in 1980 to –.31 log points
in 2000.
The table also shows, however, that as with the Mexican immigrant
sample, observable variables, and particularly educational attainment,
tend to explain much of the gap between native-born Mexicans and the
baseline group. By adjusting simply for diﬀerences in educational attain-
ment and age, the observed log wage gap of –.31 log points for Mexican na-
tives falls to –.08 log points. In other words, nearly three-quarters of the
wage diﬀerential between native-born workers of Mexican ancestry and
other native-born workers is due to diﬀerences in a minimal set of observ-
able measures of educational attainment and age.23
The empirical analysis in the previous section was unable to document
that Mexican immigrants experience substantial rates of economic assim-
ilation during the immigrants’ work life. The empirical analysis summa-
rized in table 1.10 shows that a large part of the wage disadvantage of Mex-
ican immigrants is likely to persist into the next generation. It seems,
therefore, that the very large Mexican immigrant inﬂux that entered the
United States in recent decades has experienced and will likely continue to
experience a very diﬀerent path of economic adaptation than other immi-
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23. See also Trejo (1997).grant waves. The reasons for the lagging economic performance of this
large and fast-growing population will likely be a central concern of social
science research for decades to come.
1.4 Labor Market Impact and Economic Beneﬁts
Economic theory implies that immigration should lower the wage of
competing workers and increase the wage of complementary workers. For
example, an inﬂux of foreign-born laborers reduces the economic oppor-
tunities for laborers—all laborers now face stiﬀer competition in the labor
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Table 1.10 Trends in the relative wage of the Mexican-origin population
1980 1990 2000
Male workers
A. Relative weekly wage (relative to other natives)
Mexican immigrant –.414 –.553 –.543
(.004) (.003) (.002)
Other immigrant .017 –.004 –.044
(.002) (.002) (.002)
Native-born of Mexican ancestry –.238 –.298 –.310
(.003) (.003) (.003)
B. Adjusted relative weekly wage (adjusts for education, age)
Mexican immigrant –.151 –.154 –.148
(.003) (.003) (.002)
Other immigrant –.049 –.045 –.076
(.002) (.002) (.001)
Native-born of Mexican ancestry –.075 –.098 –.075
(.003) (.002) (.002)
Female workers
C. Relative weekly wage (relative to other natives)
Mexican immigrant –.137 –.319 –.405
(.005) (.004) (.003)
Other immigrant .058 .077 .032
(.002) (.002) (.002)
Native-born of Mexican ancestry –.093 –.134 –.150
(.003) (.003) (.003)
D. Adjusted relative weekly wage (adjusts for education, age)
Mexican immigrant .036 –.015 –.073
(.005) (.004) (.003)
Other immigrant .045 .072 .025
(.002) (.002) (.002)
Native-born of Mexican ancestry .015 .013 .022
(.003) (.003) (.003)
Notes:Standard errors are in parentheses. The numbers of observations in the regressions are
as follows: 2,546,859 in the 1980 Census; 2,809,917 in the 1990 Census; and 3,164,510 in the
2000 Census. The reported wage coeﬃcients are log wage gaps relative to native-born work-
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24. Representative studies include Altonji and Card (1991), Card (1990, 2001), and Gross-
man (1982).
market. At the same time, high-skill natives may gain substantially. They
pay less for the services that laborers provide, such as painting the house
and mowing the lawn, and natives who hire these laborers can now spe-
cialize in producing the goods and services that better suit their skills.
Because of the policy signiﬁcance associated with determining the im-
pact of immigration on the employment opportunities of native workers, a
large literature developed in the past two decades attempting to measure
this impact. The starting point for much of this literature is the fact that im-
migrants in the United States cluster in a small number of geographic ar-
eas. Many studies exploit this geographic clustering to deﬁne the empirical
exercise that purports to measure the labor market impact of immigra-
tion.24 The typical study deﬁnes a metropolitan area (or state) as the labor
market that is penetrated by immigrants. The study then goes on to calcu-
late a cross-city correlation measuring the relation between the native wage
in a locality and the relative number of immigrants in that locality. A neg-
ative correlation, indicating that native wages are lower in markets with
many immigrants, would suggest that immigrants worsen the employment
opportunities of competing native workers.
There is a great deal of dispersion in the ﬁndings in this literature. Nev-
ertheless, there is a tendency for the estimated cross-city correlations to
cluster around zero, helping to create the conventional wisdom that immi-
grants have little impact on the labor market opportunities of native work-
ers, perhaps because immigrants do jobs that natives do not want to do.
Recent research, however, raises two questions about the validity of in-
terpreting near-zero cross-city correlations as evidence that immigration
has no labor market impact. First, immigrants may not be randomly dis-
tributed across labor markets. If immigrants tend to cluster in cities with
thriving economies (and high wages), there would be a built-in positive cor-
relation between immigration and wages. This positive correlation would
attenuate, and perhaps even reverse, whatever negative impact immigra-
tion might have had on wages in local labor markets.
Second, natives may respond to the wage impact of immigration by mov-
ing their labor or capital to other cities. For example, native-owned ﬁrms
see that cities in Southern California ﬂooded by low-skill immigrants pay
lower wages to laborers. Employers who hire laborers will want to relocate
to those cities. The ﬂow of jobs to the immigrant-hit areas cushions the ad-
verse eﬀect of immigration on the wage of competing workers in those lo-
calities. Similarly, laborers living in Michigan were perhaps thinking about
moving to California before the immigrants entered that state. These la-
borers learn that immigration reduced their potential wages in California,
and they may instead decide to remain where they are or move elsewhere.Moreover, some Californians might leave the state to search for better op-
portunities.
The ﬂows of capital and labor tend to equalize economic conditions
across cities. As a result, intercity comparisons of native wage rates will not
be very revealing: capital ﬂows and native migration diﬀuse the impact of
immigration across the national economy. In the end, all laborers, regard-
less of where they live, are worse oﬀ because there are now many more of
them.
Because local labor markets adjust to immigration, a number of recent
studies have emphasized that the labor market impact of immigration may
be measurable only at the national level.25Borjas (2003) used this insight to
examine the link between immigration and the evolution of wages for spe-
ciﬁc skill groups in the past few decades. His study indicates that by ana-
lyzing national trends in the labor market and by deﬁning skill groups in
terms of both educational attainment and work experience, one can make
substantial progress in determining how immigration alters the employ-
ment and earnings opportunities of native workers.
The empirical analysis reported in this section estimates a labor demand
model developed by Borjas (2003) to simulate the impact of the Mexican
immigrant inﬂux on the wages of competing workers. We restrict the sim-
ulation to male workers observed in the 1980 and 2000 Censuses. As in
Borjas (2003), the men are classiﬁed into four distinct education groups:
persons who are high school dropouts, high school graduates, persons who
have some college, and college graduates. Work experience is deﬁned as the
number of years that have elapsed since the person completed school.26The
analysis is restricted to workers with one to forty years of experience.
Workers are then grouped into eight diﬀerent experience groups, indicat-
ing if the worker has one–ﬁve years of experience, six–ten years, eleven–
ﬁfteen years, and so on. There are, therefore, a total of thirty-two skill
groups in the labor market (four education and eight experience groups).
As in Borjas (2003), suppose the aggregate production function for the
national economy at time t is
(4) Qt   ( KtKt
v    LtLt
v)1/v,
where Q is output, K is capital, L denotes the aggregate labor input; and 
v   1 – 1/ KL, with  KL being the elasticity of substitution between capital
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25. Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997) proposed the hypothesis that the labor market im-
pact of immigration may only be measurable at the national level.
26. The analysis assumes that the age of entry into the labor market is seventeen for the typ-
ical high school dropout, nineteen for the typical high school graduate, twenty-one for the
typical person with some college, and twenty-three for the typical college graduate. We re-
strict the analysis to persons who have between one and forty years of experience. By re-
stricting the sample to male workers, we are assuming a form of production separability be-
tween men and women in the production process. The inclusion of women in the analysis does
not greatly aﬀect the results, even though the allocation of women into the various labor mar-
ket experience groups likely contains a great deal of measurement error.and labor (–  v 1). The vector  gives technology parameters that shift
the production frontier, with  Kt    Lt   1. The aggregate Lt incorporates
the contributions of workers who diﬀer in both education and experience.
Let






where Lit gives the number of workers with education i at time t, and   
1 – 1/  E, with   E being the elasticity of substitution across these education
aggregates (–    1). The  it give time-variant technology parameters
that shift the relative productivity of education groups, with Σi  it   1. Fi-
nally, the supply of workers in each education group is itself given by an ag-
gregation of the contribution of similarly educated workers with diﬀerent
experience. In particular,






where Lijt gives the number of workers in education group i and experience
group j at time t (given by the sum of Nijt native and Mijt immigrant work-
ers); and   1 – 1/ X, with  X being the elasticity of substitution across
experience classes within an education group (–    1). Equation (6)
assumes that the technology coeﬃcients  ij are constant over time, with 
Σj  ij   1.
Borjas (2003) shows that the key parameters   X and   E can be estimated
by regressing the log wage of particular education-experience groups on the
log of the size of the workforce in the various cells and instrumenting the
supply variable by the immigrant share in that skill cell.27 We reestimated
the econometric framework using data from the 1960–2000 IPUMS
samples.28 Our elasticity estimates are   X   3.0 and   E   2.4. The empirical
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27. This instrument would be valid if the immigrant inﬂux into particular skill groups were
independent of the relative wages oﬀered to the various skill categories. It is likely, however,
that the number of immigrants in a skill group responds to shifts in the wage structure. In-
come-maximizing immigration would generate larger ﬂows into those skill cells that had rel-
atively high wages. This behavioral response builds in a positive correlation between the size
of the immigrant inﬂux and wages in a skill group. The elasticity estimates reported in the fol-
lowing, therefore, understate the negative wage impact of a relative supply increase.
28. More precisely, the model generates two estimating equations. The ﬁrst regresses the log
wage of a skill group (deﬁned by education and experience) on various ﬁxed eﬀects and on the
log of the size of the workforce in that group. This regression identiﬁes   X. The second aggre-
gates the data to the education group level and regresses the log wage of an education group
on vectors of ﬁxed eﬀects and on the log of the size of the workforce in the education group.
This regression identiﬁes   E. The estimation of the second-stage regression requires an as-
sumption about the trends in relative demand for various skill groups. In particular, Katz and
Murphy (1992) documented that the secular trend in relative demand shifts for high-skill
workers in a CES framework could be approximated by linear trends speciﬁc to each educa-
tion group. This approximation became an important identiﬁcation restriction for the esti-
mation of the elasticity of substitution across education groups in Card and Lemieux (2001)
and Borjas (2003). More recently, Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2005) documented that theimplementation of the three-level constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
technology described in the preceding does not use any data on the aggre-
gate capital stock so that   K cannot be directly estimated. Hamermesh
(1993, 92) concludes that the aggregate U.S. economy can be reasonably de-
scribed by a Cobb-Douglas production function, suggesting that   KLequals
one. We use this estimate in the simulation reported in the following.
The factor price elasticity giving the impact on the wage of factor yof an
increase in the supply of factor z is deﬁned by
(7) εyz   .
It is easy to show that the factor price elasticities depend on the income
shares accruing to the various factors and on the three elasticities of sub-
stitution that lie at the core of the three-level CES framework.29 The mar-
ginal productivity condition for the typical worker in education group s
and experience group xcan be written as wsx D(K, L11, . . . , L18, . . . , L41,
...  ,  L48). Assuming that the capital stock is constant, the net impact of im-
migration on the log wage of group (s, x) is






where mij gives the percentage change in labor supply due to immigration
in cell (i, j). Because the size of the native labor force in each skill group is
shifting over time, deﬁne mij as
(9) mij  
so that the baseline population used to calculate the percent increase in la-
bor supply averages out the size of the native workforce in the skill cell and
treats the preexisting immigrant population as part of the native stock.
Mij,2000   Mij,1980     
0.5(Nij,1980   Nij,2000)   Mij,1980
d log wy  
d log Lz
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growth rate in the relative demand for skilled workers slowed in the 1990s. In particular, they
ﬁnd a 20 percent decline in the secular growth rate of demand for skilled workers during the
1990s as compared to the growth rate prior to the 1990s. To capture this break in the secular
trend, we included education-speciﬁc splines in the marginal productivity equation that iden-
tiﬁes  E (instead of simple linear trends). For each education group, this variable is deﬁned by
a linear trend that increases at the rate of one per year between 1960 and 1990. The trend vari-
able then increases at a rate of 0.8 per year between 1990 and 2000. Our estimate of the inverse
elasticity 1/ X is .332 (with a standard error of .129), while the estimate of the inverse elastic-
ity 1/ E is .413 (312). The inverse elasticity of substitution across education groups is esti-
mated imprecisely because there are only twenty observations in the second-stage regression.
To improve the precision, we estimated the second-stage model using annual data from the
Current Population Surveys from 1963 through 2003. The estimated inverse elasticity was
.307 (.094). Despite the data diﬀerences, the estimates of the inverse elasticity of substitution
across education groups are roughly similar.
29. We assume that the share of income accruing to all labor groups is 0.7. We then used
data from the 1990 Census to calculate the income share accruing to each of the various
education-experience cells.The top panel of table 1.11summarizes the results of the simulation. Be-
fore proceeding to discuss the results, note that the equation (8) gives the
predicted change in the log wage for each skill (i.e., education-experience)
group. We use the share of income accruing to each of the skill groups in
2000 to calculate the weighted aggregates reported in the table. The immi-
grant inﬂux of the 1980s and 1990s lowered the wage of most native work-
ers, particularly of those workers at the bottom and top of the education
distribution. The wage fell by 8.2 percent for high school dropouts and by
3.9 percent for college graduates. In contrast, the wage of high school grad-
uates fell by just over 2 percent. Overall, the immigrant inﬂux from 1980 to
2000 is estimated to have reduced the wage of the typical native worker by
3.4 percent.
This framework provides a simple mechanism for establishing the labor
market impact of Mexican immigration. In particular, we simulated the
model to predict a new set of labor market impacts under the counterfac-
tual assumption that there had been no Mexican immigration (either legal
or illegal) between 1980 and 2000. This assumption redeﬁnes the labor
supply shocks deﬁned in equation (1). In particular, consider
(10) m∗
ij   ,
M∗
ij,2000   Mij,1980     
0.5(Nij,1980   Nij,2000)   Mij,1980
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Table 1.11 Comparing the actual impact of the 1980–2000 immigrant inﬂux with a
counterfactual of no Mexican immigration during period (predicted
percent change in the weekly wage; %)
Actual Counterfactual: 
Speciﬁcation/Group impact No Mexican immigration
Short-run: Capital is ﬁxed
All workers –3.4 –2.7
High school dropouts –8.2 –0.5
High school graduates –2.2 –1.4
Some college –2.7 –2.4
College graduates –3.9 –3.9
Long-run: Capital is perfectly elastic
All workers 0.0 0.0
High school dropouts –4.8 2.2
High school graduates 1.2 1.4
Some college 0.7 0.3
College graduates –0.5 –1.2
Notes: The simulation models in equations (8) and (11) generate wage eﬀects for speciﬁc
education-experience cells. We used the share of income accruing to each of the skill groups
in 2000 to calculate the weighted aggregates reported in this table. The predicted percent
changes refer to the product of the predicted log wage change times 100.where M∗
ij,2000 gives the size of the immigrant workforce in skill group (i, j)
in 2000 under the assumption that no Mexican immigrants entered the
United States between 1980 and 2000.30
The second column of table 1.11 shows the predicted labor market
eﬀects when the supply shocks are given by equation (1). Mexican immi-
gration, which is predominantly low skill, accounts for all of the adverse
impact of immigration on low-skill native workers. It is also worth noting
that the earnings of college graduates would still have been reduced by 3.9
percent from immigration even if there had been no Mexican immigration.
Under the constant capital stock scenario, our estimates imply the inﬂux
of low-skill Mexican immigrants did not work to improve the wage of high-
skill workers.
As emphasized in the preceding, these simulations assume the capital
stock is constant so that the results summarized in the top panel of table
1.11 represent the short-run impact of immigration. An alternative simu-
lation would measure the impacts under the assumption that the capital
stock adjusts completely to the increased labor supply. In eﬀect, this alter-
native simulation would assume that the rental price of capital (rather than
the capital stock) is constant. In other words, the adjustment of the capital
stock to immigration would reduce the rental rate of capital back to its pre-
existing equilibrium level.
The maintained assumption that   KL equals one implies that the pre-
dicted long-run wage impact on the log wage of group (s, x) is






where sK is capital’s share of income (assumed to be 0.3), and K ˜ is the per-
cent change in the capital stock induced by immigration. The assumption
that   KL is unity implies that the change in the capital stock is a weighted
average of the immigrant supply shocks in the various education-
experience groups, where the weights are the shares of income accruing to
the various groups.31 It is worth noting that equation (11) diﬀers from
equation (8) only by adding the constant skK ˜ to each group. Put diﬀerently,
full capital adjustment alters the absolute wage impact of immigration but
leaves the relative wage eﬀects unchanged. In addition, it must be the case
that the aggregate wage change must be identically equal to zero (when the
skill-speciﬁc eﬀects are aggregated using the group’s income share as
weights) because the production function in (4) has constant returns to
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30. More precisely, the variable M∗
ij,2000 is deﬁned as the immigrant stock reported in the
2000 Census after omitting from the count all Mexican-born persons who reported arriving
between 1980 and 2000.
31. To simplify notation, let n be the subscript indicating the education-experience skill
group (n   1, . . . , 32). The implied change in the capital stock K    Σn sn mn/sL, where sL is la-
bor’s share of income.scale.32 As a result, the relative wage eﬀects of immigration are much bet-
ter measured by this approach than the absolute wage eﬀects of immigra-
tion—because the relative wage eﬀects are directly estimated using varia-
tion across groups and time in the size of immigrant supply shocks, but the
absolute wage eﬀect depends crucially on (diﬃcult-to-assess) assumptions
about the response of the capital stock to the immigrant supply shift.
The bottom panel of table 1.11 uses equation (11) to predict the long-run
impact of the 1980–2000 immigrant inﬂux. As expected, the wage impact
of immigration is muted in the long run as capital adjusts to the increased
workforce. Although the average wage in the economy is unaﬀected by im-
migration, the unbalanced nature of the immigrant supply shock in terms
of the skill distribution implies that there are still distributional eﬀects. The
ﬁrst column of the table reveals that high school dropouts still experience
a sizable wage reduction, even in the long run, of about 4.8 percentage
points. The long-run increase in the capital stock, however, removes almost
the entire wage loss from immigration suﬀered by college graduates and
leads to wage improvements for high school graduates and those with some
college.
The second column of the panel shows the predicted long-run impact
under the counterfactual that no Mexicans migrated to the United States
between 1980 and 2000. It is evident that in the absence of Mexican immi-
gration, U.S. low-skill workers would have beneﬁted (through a 2.2 percent
wage increase for dropouts) from the complementarities that arise when
the immigrant inﬂux is composed mainly of high-skill workers.
Immigration may also aﬀect the economic welfare of natives through its
impact on the relative prices of goods and services.33 The skill distribution
of Mexican immigrants and their concentration in low-skill occupations
suggest that Mexican immigration may serve to expand the supply and
lower the U.S. prices of nontraded goods and services that are low-skill la-
bor intensive. In fact, a much larger share of Mexican immigrants than of
U.S. natives is employed in low-skill service jobs such as private household
occupations, food preparation occupations, and gardening. In 2000, for
example, 20.9 percent of Mexican immigrants and only 6.5 percent of
native-born workers were employed in the subset of occupations classiﬁed
as “food preparation and serving” or “buildings and grounds cleaning and
maintenance.” American consumers who spend more on low-skill inten-
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32. The choice of the weights is not a trivial decision. For example, Ottaviano and Peri
(2005) carry out a similar simulation where they use employment shares as weights and con-
clude that immigration raises the average wage in the labor market, even though the ﬁrst-
degree homogeneous production function would imply that the average wage must remain
constant under the assumption of full capital adjustments.
33. Rivera-Batiz (1983) provides a useful summary of the implications of alternative multi-
sector trade models for the distributional impacts on rich countries of low-skill immigration
from poor to rich countries.sive nontraded goods and services will tend to disproportionately beneﬁt
from the recent wave of Mexican immigration.
Some recent exploratory work has exploited cross-area variation in
changes in low-skill immigrants as a share of the workforce to estimate the
impacts of increased low-skill immigration on the supply and prices of low-
skill intensive services. This approach will tend to understate the price
impacts on nontraded services intensively employing new low-skill immi-
grants to the extent the expansion in the overall national supply of less-
educated workers also aﬀects low-immigrant receiving areas by altering
native labor and capital ﬂows. Khananusapkul (2004) ﬁnds using U.S. Cen-
sus data from 1970 to 2000 that a 1 percentage point increase in the share
of low-skill female immigrants in a metropolitan area increases the pro-
portion of private household workers by 6 percentage points and lowers
the wages in the private household sector by 3 percent. This evidence indi-
cates a direct supply expansion in the low-skill female intensive sector
when more low-skill female immigrants are available in a labor market.
Cortes (2005) examines the impacts on prices and consumer expendi-
tures for nontraded goods and services of changes in the workforce share
of low-skilled immigrants (mainly Mexican immigrants) across U.S. met-
ropolitan areas from 1990 to 2000. Her estimates imply that an increase in
the share of low-skill immigrants in an area signiﬁcantly reduces the prices
of goods and services in low-skilled immigrant-intensive industries such as
housekeeping and gardening. Cortes ﬁnds that low-skilled immigration in
the 1990s improved the purchasing power of high-skilled U.S. natives, but
it worked to reduce the purchasing power of native high school dropouts
as the negative wage impacts of immigration for less-skilled workers greatly
outweighed the price reductions for a limited set of nontraded goods and
services.
The large growth and predominantly low-skilled nature of Mexican im-
migration to the United States over the past two decades appears to have
played a modest role in the widening of the U.S. wage structure by ad-
versely aﬀecting the earnings of less-educated native workers and improv-
ing the earnings of college graduates. The estimates in table 1.11 imply that
Mexican immigration from 1980 to 2000 reduced the wages of U.S. high
school dropouts relative to college graduates by 7.7 percent. U.S. natives
(especially high-skill natives) appear to have beneﬁted from greater avail-
ability and reduced prices of nontraded goods and services that are inten-
sive in low-skill labor.
1.5 Summary
This paper uses the IPUMS data from 1900 through 2000 to document
the evolution of the Mexican-born workforce in the U.S. labor market. It is
well known, of course, that there has been a rapid rise in Mexican immi-
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ican immigrants in the U.S. workforce declined steadily beginning in the
1920s before beginning to rise in the 1960s. It was not until 1980 that the
relative number of Mexican immigrants in the U.S. workforce was at the
1920s level.
The analysis of the economic performance of these immigrants
throughout the twentieth century yields a number of interesting and po-
tentially important ﬁndings:
1. Mexican immigrants have much less educational attainment than ei-
ther native-born workers or non-Mexican immigrants. These diﬀerences in
human capital account for nearly three-quarters of the very large wage dis-
advantage suﬀered by Mexican immigrants in recent decades.
2. Although the earnings of non-Mexican immigrants converge to those
of their native-born counterparts as the immigrants accumulate work ex-
perience in the U.S. labor market, this type of wage convergence has been
much weaker on average for Mexican immigrants than for other immigrant
groups.
3. Although native-born workers of Mexican ancestry have levels of hu-
man capital and earnings that far exceed those of Mexican immigrants, the
economic performance of these native-born workers lags behind that of
native workers who are not of Mexican ancestry. Much of the wage gap be-
tween the two groups of native-born workers can be explained by the large
diﬀerence in educational attainment between the two groups.
4. The large Mexican inﬂux in recent decades widened the U.S. wage
structure by adversely aﬀecting the earnings of less-educated native work-
ers and improving the earnings of college graduates. These wage eﬀects
have, in turn, lowered the prices of nontraded goods and services that are
low-skill labor intensive.
There is little evidence that the inﬂux of Mexican-born workers into the
United States is slowing down as we enter a new century, and there is also
little evidence that the skill composition of the Mexican inﬂux is changing
from what it has been in the past. The continued migration of Mexican
workers into the United States and the inevitable rapid growth of the group
of native-born workers of Mexican ancestry suggest that the economic con-
sequences of this low-skill migration inﬂux are only beginning to be felt.
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